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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JAMES E. REED,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-v.-

Case No. 8612

HEPBURN T.AR~1STRONG,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of facts as set forth by appellant is
correct, but incomplete. Respondent desires to set forth
additional pertinent facts.
Appellant sued for the value of 67,000 shares of common stock of Wyoming Uranium Corporation. Under
Exhibit A, a Contract dated July 14, 1954, set forth in
appellant's Brief at pages 2 and 3 thereof, re.spondent
received from appellant $2000.00 of which $1000.00 was
to be utilized to obtain A.E.C. certification of certain
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m1nmg claims, and in the event legislation should be
passed making such certification unnecessary the $1000.00
would be returned to appellant. Respondent agreed to
incorporate the Wyoming Uranium Corporation .and to
give to appellant 134,000 shares of the capital stock thereof for the $2000.00 paid by appellant to respondent,
provided, however, that in the event the aforesaid
$1000.00 was returned to appellant within ten days from
the date of the Agreement, appellant should receive
67,000 shares only.
Almost immediately after July 14, 1954, respondent
learned that A.E.C. certification would not be necessary,
and he informed plaintiff of that fact, and that the
$1000.00 would be returned to plaintiff although it might
not be within ten days. The Court found that plaintiff
by oral agreement abrogated the ten-day condition and
permitted the $1000.00 to be returned within a reasonable time, and that the same was returned within a
reasonable time and plaintiff .agreed to accept 66,666
share.s instead of 134,000 and that the agreement was
executed by plaintiff and defendant.
On the 29th of July, 1954, almost immediately after
the aforesaid oral agreement appellant gave respondent
a check for $1500.00 on the back thereof over signature
of endorsmnent of respondent appears:
"Payment of $1500.00 or part thereof as needed
for 100,000 shares of stock in proposed \Vyoming
Uranium Company enlarges agreen1ent of July
14, 1954."
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It is stipulated that the 100,000 shares of stock for
which appellant paid $1500.00 on July 29, 1954, has been
delivered and 66,666 shares of stock have been delivered
under the agreement of July 14, 1954.
Appellant's action is to recover the value of 67,000
shares which he claims is due to him under the Contract
of July 1±, 1954, because the $1000.00 which was returned
to appellant approximately forty-five days after receipt
thereof was not returned within ten days.
The cause was tried upon appellant's complaint and
respondent's Second Amended Answer. By his answer
respondent alleged that the provision that 134,000 shares
would be delivered to appellant under the Agreement of
July 14, 1954, instead of 67,000 shares, in the event
$1000.00 was not returned within ten days, constituted
an agreement for a penalty and was void and unenforceable as to the difference between 134,000 and 67,000
shares. The Court so found (R. 76).
As a Third Affirmative Defense respondent alleged
that during the months of March, 1955, and November,
1955, respondent delivered the stock agreed to be delivered under the Agreements of July 14, 1954, and July
29, 1954, in the amount of 166,666 shares, and the same
were accepted by appellant, and appellant waived claim
to any additional shares of the capital stock of Wyoming
Uranium Corporation. In the findings and judgment
the Court failed to find on this issue, although in his oral
order for judgment the Court found that the agreement
for acceptance of 166,666 shares was executed.
Appellant is an Investn1ent Dealer and acted .as
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Underwriter for Wyoming Uranium Corporation in the
sale of 9,166,666 shares of said corporation's common
stock. As such Underwriter he was required to furnish
to each purchaser an Offering Circular. An Offering
Circular must set forth all pre-organization stock.
The offering Circular for Wyoming tTranium Corporation was prepared by C. Allen Elggren (R. 34-35).
Counsel for respondent read to appellant the following from the Offering Circular:
"At the completion of the offering 1,500,00 shares
that would be held by the promoters will represent
13.8o/o of the outstanding stock; the 166,667 shares
held by Dr. Reed P. Larson for which he paid
$2500.00 will represent 1.5% of the outstanding
stock."
and asked if he, the appellant, knew what was in the
circular, to which he answered: "Certainly" (R. 64).
When respondent first went to appellant to solicit
pre-organization money, appellant told respondent that
he would obtain the money from a potential investor,
Reed P. Larson, and that same day he went to the office
of Reed P. Larson, which was in the srune building as the
office of appellant (R. 50). Appellant was asked why
his name was not included in the Offering Circular as
being entitled to any pre-organization stock. He an~'vered it was the suggestion of :Mr. Elggren that it
would be better not to haYe an lTnderwriter shown as
having received pre-organization stork (R. 56). Thus
the stoek C'lairned by appellant was shown in the Offering
( ~ircular as belonging to a client of appellant, Dr. Reed
P. Larson.
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The stock purchased under the Contract of July
14, 1954, and the check of July 29, 1954, were the only
transactions in which Reed and Larson were involved
jointly with Wyoming Uranium Corpor.ation (R. 63).
Objections were sustained to questions asked Mr.
Elggren concerning his discussion with appellant concerning the number of shares of pre-organization stock
which he or Reed P. Larson were entitled to. The Court
sustained the objections on the ground that the communications between 11r. Elggren ·and Mr. Reed were
confidential, and that he was acting for ,appellant as well
as Wyoming Uranium Corporation in the preparation
of the Offering Circular.
The following offer of proof was made by respondent
and refused by the Court :
"I offer to prove by this witness both in connection with this and the other objections which
have been sustained to my questions, that this
witness, if permitted to ,answer, would testify
he discussed these matters with Mr. Reed and that,
Mr. Reed told him that the stock to which he was
entitled, to which he and Mr. Larson together
were entitled was 166,666 .shares, and that the
same should be noted in the Offering Circular
and in the name of Mr. Larson, and that the
166,666 shares mentioned therein is the stock
to which Mr. Reed, or :Mr. Reed and Mr. Larson
together would be. entitled under the agreement,
and the check, whiCh have heretofore been introduced in this matter." (R. 39)
Respondent testified that during the ten-day period
following the execution of the Agreement of July 14,
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1954, he had received the information that the A.E.C.
Mineral Leasing Act was going out. That on July 27th
or 28th respondent returned to Salt Lake City and talked
to appellant and informed him that the $1000.00 received
for A.E.C. certification would not be used, but would be
returned to .appellant, but that even though he wouldn't
need the money for leases he could use more money for
land operations. He stated they agreed to modify the
original agreernent and for the $1000.00 which had been
paid to him appellant would get stock for a penny and
a half per share, that is, 66,000 shares of stock, and that
he would not receive any stock for the $1000.00 that had
been sent to the A.E.C., and which would soon be returned
to him, but that appellant would, however, give to respondent an additional $1500.00 for which he would get
another 100,000 shares of stock, which would make 166,000 shares of stock (R. 47).

Respondent stated:
"The $1,000.00, if they didn't use it for leases,
he got his money back, he got 66,000 shares for
the original $1000.00 I took to Lander and for
this fifteen hundred he got an additional 100,000
and that is 166,000 share.s, that is what I understood at the time, .and what I understood until
a year and a half later, that is what we put in
the Offering Circular, and the stock then was
3c a share, and it wasn't until a year .and a half
later when the stock went up to 20c a share he
said he would hold me to that ten days clause in
there.'' (R. 47)
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ARGU~IENT

Appellant argues his case under three points:
"I. The Trial Court erred in its ruling that
Clause B. of plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 constitutes
a penalty and is unenforceable.
"II. The Trial Court erred in its admission
of parol evidence to vary the terms of written
contracts, plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2.
"III. The Trial Court erred in permitting
defendant to reduce his contractual obligation
without consideration."
It is the position of respondent that the Court did
not err in any of the three particulars relied upon by
appellant. In addition respondent submits that the Court
erred in excluding the testimony of C. Allen Elggren
and in failing to enter a finding to the effect that the
oral agreement of appellant to accept 166,666 shares
was fully executed, although the Court did make such
finding in his oral decision. Respondent is, therefore,
presenting his case under six points:
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULING
THAT CLAUSE B OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. I CONSTITUTES A PENALTY AND IS UNENFORCEABLE.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
PAROL EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF
THE WRITTEN CONTRACT OF JULY 14, 1954.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
RESPONDENT TO REDUCE A ·CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT MR. ELGGREN TO TESTIFY AS TO CONVERSATIONS
WITH APPELLANT ·CONCERNING STATEMENTS MADE
IN THE OFFERING CIRCULAR RELATIVE TO PRE-ORGANIZATION STOCK TO WHICH APPELLANT OR REED
P. LARSON WERE ENTITLED.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ORAL AGREEMENT OF APPELLANT TO ACCEPT 166,666 SHARES WAS
FULLY EXE·CUTED.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT DELIVERED 166,666 SHARES TO APPELLANT WHICH HE
ACCEPTED AND WAIVED CLAIM TO ANY ADDITIONAL
SHARES.
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULING
THAT CLAUSE B OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. I CONSTITUTES A PENALTY AND IS UNENFORCEABLE.

Appellant's argument in effect is that the contract
provides for a return of 67,000 shares of stock upon the
happening of a condition subsequent, and is not a contract for a forfeiture or penalty. The gist of appellant's
argu1nent on this point is found in the last two paragraphs of his argu1nent under his Point I on page 9 as
follows:
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"The condition subsequent that would entitle defendant to receive back 67,000 shares was beyond
the control of either party. Defendant had nothing to perform, .and no control over the condition and both parties knew of this and contracted in relation to it.
"It is respectfully urged that the legal relationship established was not for penalty. It may have
been otherwise, if defendant had agreed to convey 67,000 shares, only, plus an additional 67,000
shares if he did not return the money in ten ( 10)
days. Such is not the case and the agreement
clearly shows such was not the intent."
Appellant is wrong is his statement that respondent had nothing to perform and no control over the condition. Respondent could have returned the $1000.00
·the next day and eliminated any claim of appellant to
the 67,000 shares in question. The form of the contract
is not controlling, if in fact it provides for a forfeiture
or a penalty. The nature of forfeitures and penalties
is discussed at length in Williston on Contracts, Chapter
28, Vol. 3, pages 2169 to 2285, under the title "Excuse
of Conditions and Promises vVhich vVould Cause a Forfeiture or Penalty."
The following is from 3 Williston on Contracts, Section 769, page 2170:
"Though the law cannot create contractual obligations which were not based on the expressed
intention of the parties, it can excuse the performance either of conditions or promises agreed
upon by the parties for any reasons which seem
to be just. The mere fact that a promise or condition is somewhat harsh or unfair in its opera-
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tion is not enough to furnish such an excuse, but
a principle of somewhat vague boundaries prohibits the enforcement of forfeitures and penalties. Though these two words are often used as
synonyms, the word 'forfeiture' carries the implication of deprivation of something previously
owned as distinguished from subjection to a
liability, but the distinction is often blurred."
In the case at bar respondent is in effect deprived
of property which he owned, if he is required to give
the additional 67,000 shares of stock to appellant. As
owner of the uranium claims which he agreed to convey
to the corporation and receive stock in exchange therefor,
he is in effect by giving stock being deprived of the
value of .so much of his mining claims .as would be represented by the additional 67,000 shares of stock.
Under the section heading: "The Form of the Contract Cannot Make a Penalty Enforceable," Williston on
Contracts, Section 782, page 2198, the author says:
"Numerous attempts have been made to achieve
the desired result of malting a penal sum recoverable in case of the nonperformance of a
contract. If the question were wholly one of
interpretation, such attempts would never be successful. It is not difficult to make clear beyond
dispute that recovery of any amount nruned w.as
contemplated and was intended if the promisor
failed to fulfil his priinary undertaking or any
perforrnance nruned as an alternatiYe ~ but though
the decisions are not wholly uniforrn principle
and authority both justify the statement at the
heading of this section."
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The following is from 3 Williston on Contracts, Section 777, page 2185:
"Therefore, the first step toward a clear understanding of the matter, is to recognize that
the determination of whether a particular provision is penal or merely provides for liquidated
damages only, does not depend on the natural
meaning of the language used by the parties. The
leg.al effect of an instrument depends on rules
of law which sometimes contradict the meaning
of the instrument and the intention of the parties.
Probably all that most courts mean-at any rate
all that can be defended-is to say that the validity of the stipulation is to be 'judged of as at the
time of the making of the contract not as at the
time of the breach,' and this is undoubtedly true."
At Section 778, page 2190, of the same work, the author states:
"Intention of the parties is a misleading and
undesirable designation for this requirement and
the first step toward clearing the confusion of
the law on the subject is to drop the use of the
phrase from the discussion. Even the suggested
substitute of an inquiry \Yhether the p.artie.s in
good faith attempted to estimate the real injury
is a somewhat artificial cloak for the true principle, for the only evidence that the court ever
has before it bearing on the issue is whether the
parties in good faith made such an estimate,
beside their statement in the contract, that the
sum named is liquidated damage.s or a penalty,
(and to this, as has been seen, the court rightly
pays little attention), is the reasonableness in fact
of the amount; and the matter would be much
simplified if it were clearly recognized and stated
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that the reasonableness of the agreed sum looked
at as of the time when the contract was made is
the only important thing."
In Section 779, page 2190, of the same work the author states:
"In spite of the language of cases regarding
the intention of the parties, there is little doubt
that .a sum named as liquidated damages in order
to give effect must be reasonable in amount."
This Court has adopted the same rule in a number
of cases including:
Bramwell Inv. Co. v. U ggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.(2)
913, 916.
Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98.
Thomas v. Foulger, 71 Utah 274, 264 P. 975.
Croft v. Jensen, 40 P.(2) 198,f(Utah iJ_.
In the last cited case, Croft v. Jensen, the Court held
that calling a sum to be paid under a contract liquidated
or stipulated damages will not prevent the court from
treating it as a penalty.
An interesting case cited and discussed at length
by Williston in his treatise on Contracts to the point
that the form of the contract is not controlling is Maybury v. Spinney Maybury Co., 122 l\Ie. -±22, 120 Atl. 611.
In that case a contract was rnade for the lease of certain
rnachinery which provided for the payrnent on the last
day of each c.alendar rnonth of fixed rentals or royalties
accruing for the use of the rnachines during that month.
The contract provided that in all cases where lessee
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should pay to lessor on or before the 15th day of the
calendar rnonth the rent or royalty for the next preceding calendar month, lessor would in consideration of
such prompt payment grant a discount of fifty per cent
of such rent or royalty due for such preceding calendar
month. The Court held that although the contract denominated the difference between the larger and the
smaller as a discount and had phrased the contract in
terms appropriate to a discount, the Court was not precluded from seeking the intent of the parties to determine whether the smaller anwunt was in fact the actual
debt and the larger sum was a penalty and that the only
amount owing was the smaller .amount even though payment was not rnade promptly within the fifteen days.
In the case at bar had the phrase "within ten days"
been omitted there could be no question that the appellant
would not be entitled to the additional 67,000 shares
of stock. Thus, it .appears that if the contract is enforced,
respondent forfeits 66,666 shares of stock contracted at
the time at l¥2c a share, or a value of $1000.00, for
thirty or thirty-five days delay in returning $1000.00.
As is generally held, the damages for such delay would
be reasonable interest. Interest at 6% per annum for
.a month and a half would amount to $7.50. Thus it appears that the stipulated penalty in this case of $1000.00
worth of stock, 66,666 shares, is for a delay which could
not damage appellant more than $7.50.
Thus, respondent repeats as stated in Section 779,
page 2191, of Williston on Contracts:
"In spite of the language of cases regarding

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
the intention of the parties, there is little doubt
that a sum named as liquidated damages in order
to be given effect must be reasonable in amount
.... This is but saying, that the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the stipulation is decisive."
Re.spondent submits that the Court did not err in
its finding that the agre,ement to give an additional
$1000.00 worth of stock if the $1000.00 was not returned
in ten days provides for a penalty or forfeiture and is
unenforceable.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING
PAROL EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF
THE WRITTEN CONTRA!CT OF JULY 14, 1954.

Written contracts may be modified by parol agreements. 17 C. J. S. Section 373, page 857.
As stated in Smith v. Washburn, 54 Ida. 659, 34 Pac.
(2d) 969:
"It is the general rule of law that p.arties to
an unperformed contract 1nay, by mutual consent, modify it by altering, excising and adding
provisions, and such modification may be by
parol agree1nent though the contract is in writing."
The Court found that appellant consented to the
1nodification to provide that for the $1000.00 which would
be returned in a reasonable ti1ne no stock would be given.
The essence of nwdification in this case is merely an extension fr01n ten days to a reasonable tin1e within which
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to return the $1000.00. As stated in 17 C.J.S., Section
506, page 1080:
"The time for performance of ,a written contract
may be waived by parol," citing Opjon v. Engebo,
73 Wash. 324, 131 Pac. 1146.
In Parker v. Weber County Irr. Co., 65 Utah 354,
236 Pac. 1105, this Court held that a written instrument
may be modified by a subsequent parol agreement.
Appellant in his Brief at page 10 and 11 cites Verdi
v. Helper State Bank, 196 Pac. 225, to the point that a
written certificate of deposit could not be modified by
parol agreement. In that case the Court stated at page
228:
"Whether there was a modification of the terms
of the certificate respecting the payment of interest or whether a new agreement was entered
into whereby the bank agreed to pay the interest,
is .a question of fact upon which we express no
opinion. Moreover, the evidence in that regard
must be limited to the allegations of the complaint."
A reading of that ca.se will disclose that the Court
did not hold that a written certificate of deposit could
not be subsequently 1nodified by an oral agreement.
If .appellant is arguing that the writt·en contract of
,July 14, 1954, cannot be modified by parol because the
parol agreement was embodied in the agreement on the
back of the check, the answer of respondent to that
proposition is that the statement on the back of the
check is not a complete contract, did not integrate the
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agreements of the parties, and, therefore, the oral agreement is admissible.
On this matter McCormick on Evidence at page 431,
in discussing whether a memorandum purports to be a
complete writing, and, therefore, would bar parol agreement, the author states:
('The writing is still the sole criterion by which
to determine whether it is 'complete,' but it is
the writing considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances. All, that is, except one.
You may consider the 'entire situation leading up
to the signing of the writing except the most
crucial of all data, i.e., the purport of the alleged
agreement which has been left out of the writing.~'
The author goes on to discuss the proposition that
it is for the judge to control the admission of such evidence, .and at page 435) quoting from Wigmore upon the
question of whether the parties intended the signed document to displace the oral agreement, states:
"'In deciding upon this intent, the chief and
most satisfactory index for the judge is found
in the circumstance whether or not the particular
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is
dealt with at all in the writing. If it is mention~d
or dealt with in the writing, then presumably the
writing was 1neant to repre.sent all of the transaction on that element; if it is not, then probably
the writing was not intended to en1body that element of the negotiation.' "
In this case there is no 1nention in the writing covering the oral .agremnent to provide that under the contract
of July 14, 1954, only 66,666 shares would be delivered.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
RESPONDENT TO REDUCE A .CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.

Appellant argues that the Court was 1n error in
allowing the oral modification of the Contract of July
14, 1954, to provide that the 66,666 shares need not be
delivered if the $1000.00 was returned within a re.asonable time instead of within ten days. He argues that a
con.sideration is required for the modification of the
agreement.
This is no doubt true of executory contracts, but
in this case, as respondent has point,ed out several times
alre.ady in his Brief, appellant accepted the lesser amount
of stock and by furnishing an Offering Circular to each
prospective purcha.ser of stock he not only evidenced
his compl'ete acceptance of the modification, but in effect
made a contract with the purchasers of stock to the
effect that if they made a purchase of stock, that the
value of their stock would not be diluted by the delivery
to him or anyone else of additional shares of preorganization stock for which no more money would be paid.
The law on the matter of the requirement of a consideration for an executed modifying .agreement is stated
in 17 C.J.S. 861, Sec. 376, under the heading of ContractsModification-Consideration, as follows:
"While consideration is necessary to support a
modification of a contract, a new consideration
has been held unnecessary at least where the
contract is executory or the modification merely
explan.atory, and an executed modified agreement
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will not be disturbed for want of consideration
.... Where a modified agreement has been fully
executed it will not be disturbed for want of consideration and there are cases which hold that
where one party has performed a modified agreement to such an extent that it would work a fraud
or injury on the other party to repudiate it, the
modified contract will be sustained."
Included in the cases cited in support of this general
rule of law is a Utah case directly in point-Nordfors v.
Knight, 60 Pac.(2d) 1115, 1118, 90 Utah 114. In that case
plaintiff contracted to purchase certain lands from defendant for the sum of $3500.00, payable $1750.00 cash upon the execution of the agreement, and $1750.00 at a later
date. Before the S'econd payment became due plaintiff
informed defendant that he would not pay $1750.00 because the property was not worth the purchase price,
but he would pay $1250.00, which defendant agreed to
accept. Subsequently plaintiff sued defendant stating
that not all the land agreed to be delivered ·was delivered,
and defendant counterclailned for $500.00, alleging that
there was no consideration for the reduction of the balance of the purchase price from $1750.00 to $1250.00.
The Court found that the payment of $1250.00 was made,
at which time plaintiff accmnpanied defendant to the
hank and received the contract, deed and abstract of
title, and that no further claim was n1ade until the suit
was brought over the boundary lines, at which time defendant counterclain1ed for the additional $500.00. The
Court found against defendant on his counterclaim. The
Court stated:
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"We think the evidence fully sustains the findings
of the court. It may be conceded that as a general rule a consideration is necessary to sustain a contract modifying .an existing contract,
but as stated in 13 C.J. 592, Sec. 607, 'where a
modified agreement has been fully executed it
will not be disturbed for a want of consideration.'
See, also, Vigelius v. Vigelius, 169 Washington
190, 13 Pac. (2d) 425; Davis v. Culmer, 221 Mo.
App. 1037, 295 S.W. 803. The modifying agreement in this case was fully performed, .and the
deed, abstract and original agreement delivered
to plaintiff by defendant himself. The deal was
finally closed and considered closed by both parties for over two years. The whole transaction
showed an intent, which w.as fully and completely
carried out, to perforn1 and accept performance
under the new agreen1ent and a mutual abandonment of the old agreement. It must follow that
defendant, under the facts of this case, cannot
now claim that the agreement thus performed is
a nullity for want of consideration."
Other recent cases on this subject to the same effect
are:

Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lbr.
Co., 62 Ida. 683, 115 Pac. (2d) 401;
Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wash. (2d) 818, 226 Pac. (2d)
218;
Julian v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 3 Pac. (2d) 1009.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT MR. ELGGREN TO TESTIFY AS TO CONVERSATIONS
WITH APPELLANT ·CONCERNING STATEMENTS MADE
IN THE OFFERING CIRCULAR RELATIVE TO PRE-OR-
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GANIZATION STOCK TO WHICH APPELLANT OR REED
P. LARSON WERE ENTITLED.

The Court struck the testimony of Mr. Elggren upon
the theory that Mr. Elggren was acting as attorney for
plaintiff, and that any communications made were confidential and privileged.
Mr. Elggren testified that he was not employed by
Mr. Reed, but that he was acting as attorney for Wyoming Uranium Company in the preparation of the Offering Circular ( R. 35).
If Mr. Elggren had been acting for I\Ir. Reed, the
testimony would still be admissible. It is only as to confidential communications that the attorney may not
testify.
As stated in McCormick on Evidence, page 190:
"It is the essence of the privilege that it is limited
to those communications as to which the client
either expressly made confidential or which he
would reasonably assume under the circumstances
would be understood by the attorney as so intended. . . Wherever the n1atters communicated
to the attorney are intended by the client to bB
made public or revealed to third persons, obviously the element of confidentiality is wanting."
1n this matter all conversation.s between ~Ir. Elggren
and Mr. Reed which were the subject of the testimony
which was not adn1itted had to do with the amount of
stock to whirh Thlr. Reed, either in his own name or in
the name of Dr. Reed P. Larson, w.as entitled so that
the mnount thereof could be stated in the Offering Circu-
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lar and the information communicated through the Offering Circular to every prospective purchaser of Wyoming
Uranium Company stock. Nothing could be farther from
the thought that this was a confidential communication
a.s it was intended to be made public, and, therefore,
under the law as stated above, it should not have been
excluded.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ORAL AGREEMENT OF APPELLANT TO ACCEPT 166,666 SHARES WAS
FULLY EXgCUTED.

The Court in rendering his order for judgment
stated:
"It is the further holding of the Court that the
contract dated July 14, 1954, was modified by
a subsequent oral agreement which abrogated
the ten day provision and permitted the $1000.00
to be returned within a reasonable time, and the
$1000.00 was returned within a reasonable time
and plaintiff at the same time in the oral agreement agreed to accept 66,666 shares of stock under
the agreement of July 14th, as is right, and that
agreement was executed by the plaintiff and defendant." (R. 71) (Italics ours)
By oversight the Finding upon this matter was
omitted in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
It is true that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law were prepared by Counsel for respondent. However, the law imposes the burden upon the Court to make
full findings upon all1natters additional.
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POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER
A FINDING TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT DELIVERED 166,666 SHARES TO APPELLANT WHICH HE
ACCEPTED AND WAIVED CLAIM TO ANY ADDITIONAL
SHARES.

As a Third Affirmative Defense respondent alleged
that during the months of 1\iarch, 1955, and November,
1955, respondent delivered the stock agreed to be delivered under the agreements of July 14, 1954, and July
29, 1954, in the amount of 166,666 shares and the same
were accepted by appellant and appellant waived claim
to any additional share.s of the capital stock of Wyoming
Uranium Corporation.
Respondent has set forth above the evidence that
appellant accepted the 166,666 shares and made no claim
for the additional 66,666 shares for a long time thereafter, during which time the stock had risen in value
from 3c to 19lf2c a share.
Under the subject of Contracts the matter of Waiver
is discus.sed in 12 Am. Jur., 918, Section 354:
"Strict and full performance of a contract by
one party may be waived by the other party as
a condition precedent may be waived by the party
in whose favor they are 1nade."
As stated in Woodard v. Speck, 117 Okla. 27, 245
Pac. 630, .as Syllabus 2 to the case:
"Where there has been a breach of contract for
sale of land sufficient to cause forfeiture and
party entitled thereto either expressly or by conduct waives forfeiture or acquiesces in breach he
will be precluded in enforcing forfeiture."
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The law is that the fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in accordance with its
existence as stated in Smith v. Washburn, 54 Ida. 659,
34 Pac.(2d) 969: ~ r: c.d4. f't.J : .!~~ J? t.
"So assent may be i~lied from .acts of one party
in accordance with the terms of the change proposed by the other and assent to new terms of
performance even if invalid as a contract will
serve as an estoppel excusing what otherwise
would be a default."
In the case at bar, if it were concluded that the or.al
modification of the agree1nent of July 14, 1954, were
inadmissible, still the evidence is before the court that
respondent told appellant that the $1000.00 would be
returned within a reasonable time instead of within ten
days, and that nothing would be p.aid to appellant for
said $1000.00. It is not necessary under the law as stated
above to establish that there was a complete parol agreement to such proposition. The fact is that .appellant performed in accordance with that statement of the respondent and should be estopped after the contract was fully
executed in accordance with said statement of respondent to claim the additional sh.ares.
See also Condit and Conser v. Moon Motor Co., 129
Ore. 161, 276 Pac. 265, in which the Court cites Williston
on Contracts, Sec. 90, as follows:
"'Assent m.ay be indicated by acts ·as well as by
words.'"
In this c3cse, as has before been stated, appellant
distributed Offering Circulars which stated that the
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stock was given for $2500.00 in the amount of 166,666
shares, and as respondent testified :
"That is what we put in the Offering Circular and
the stock then was 3c a share and it wasn't until
a year and a half later when the stock went up
to 20c a share that he said he would hold me to
that ten-day clause in there."
In this case an estoppel or waiver is particularly
appropriate under the circumstances as stated by respondent.
SUMMARY
Appellant has received stock at 1¥2c per share for
.all moneys paid by him. It was the intent of the agreements between respondent and appellant that he should
purchase stock at 1 ¥2c per share. Respondent delivered
the stock on that basi.s and appellant accepted it in full
execution of the contract. By the Offering Circular appellant in effect represented to his customers that no
more stock was due to him. To require respondent to
pay 19¥2c a share for stock which was worth 3c a share
when the agreement was executed would work a gross
inequity. Justice has been accorded appellant.
Respondent submits that the Trial Court was right
in its rulings and its decision, and that the appeal should
be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
J. GRANT IVERSON
Attorney for Respondent.
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